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 In this Editorial, we discuss the past, present and future of an emerging and fast-
developing field – spontaneous future cognition. In tracking the past of this research, the 
trajectories of research on mind-wandering, episodic future thinking and prospective memory are 
briefly examined, and their relation with spontaneous future cognition demarcated. Three broad 
methodological approaches (questionnaire, naturalistic and laboratory) used to study 
spontaneous future thoughts are described, providing an overview of the field. The present state 
of this research is represented by a themed analysis of the articles included in this Special Issue. 
The breadth of studies (covering cognitive mechanisms, developmental stages and 
psychopathology) have already led to important insights, especially concerning the conditions in 
which spontaneous future thoughts most commonly arise and who may be predisposed to 
experiencing them. In the future, greater effort should focus on developing a theoretical account 
of spontaneous future cognition – this may increase our understanding of how and why 
spontaneous future thoughts occur. If future research in this area reflects the diversity and depth 
within this Special Issue, a flourishing of research on spontaneous future cognition will be on the 
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Spontaneous future cognition: The past, present and future of an emerging topic 
In the last decade, there has been an explosion of interest among cognitive psychologists 
and neuroscientists towards studying involuntary or spontaneous cognitive phenomena in the 
form of conscious thoughts and memories that come to mind without a deliberate intention to 
have them (e.g., having a thought about an upcoming exam while driving to work). A second 
stream of research has examined the nature and characteristics of how humans deliberately 
imagine the future (termed future thinking). From a synergy of these two research streams a new 
topic has now emerged that can be referred to as spontaneous future cognition or, more 
specifically, as spontaneous episodic future thinking. A key motivator for this special issue was 
the workshop on ‘Spontaneous Future Projections in Healthy Individuals and in Psychological 
Disorders’ held in York (UK) in July, 2017. The number, diversity and quality of research 
presented at this workshop demonstrated a vibrant and emerging area, prompting us to bring 
together most recent research in a special issue, and showcasing the ‘state of play’ of the field.  
In this collection of papers, we demonstrate that this relatively new field has (1) already 
attracted researchers from diverse areas (e.g., developmental, clinical and experimental 
psychology) and (2) has started to deliver insights on how, when and to whom spontaneous 
future thoughts occur. However, we also appreciate that the area is in an embryonic state, and, as 
such, requires a solid evidence-based conceptual framework from which to understand its 
history, clarify its present and guide its future. To this end, this Editorial presents a brief timeline 
and conceptual framework for spontaneous future cognition, and summarises the diverse 
contributions within the Issue. Foreshadowing some of this paper, we believe the emerging 
research in this area presents some challenges for related and more traditional approaches to 
research on episodic future thinking, mind-wandering and prospective memory, but we also 
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focus on the various new and exciting opportunities this creates for researchers examining basic 
science and those interested in clinical applications. 
The Past: Brief Historical Overview 
If interest in spontaneous cognition were plotted on a frequency graph with time on the x-
axis, it would form two ‘peaks’. The first peak occurred in the 1960s. Following a deterioration 
in belief that behaviourism could offer a fundamental understanding of psychology, a flurry of 
research emerged interested in the internally-generated contents of the mind, eschewing 
psychology’s tradition of examining task-related cognitive processes (hence the term stimulus-
independent thought, Singer, 1966). In the midst of the ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1960s were 
several ground-breaking studies on the contents of the meandering mind, broadly concerned with 
understanding spontaneous thought (Antrobus, 1968; Antrobus, Singer & Greenberg, 1966). This 
first ‘peak’ led to important books and periodicals subsequently published in the 1970s and 
1980s (Giambra, 1977; Klinger & Cox, 1978; Klinger, 1971, 1978), but with interest waning 
thereafter.  
The second peak came with the emergence of a striking finding that a distinct and 
dissociable neuroanatomical network becomes active when people are ostensibly off-task, and is 
deactivated when they are on-task (Andreasen, O'Leary, Cizadlo, Arndt, & Rezai, 1995;  
Raichle, Macleod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard & Shulman, 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). This 
initiated a vibrant upsurge of research on the neuroscience of the default mode network (a 
distributed brain network including medial prefrontal cortices, medial temporal lobes, and 
posterior cingulate) characterised as a set of interconnected nodes in the brain that support 
spontaneous, unconstrained task-unrelated thoughts or mind-wandering (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Vincent et al., 2006; Spreng & Schacter, 2012).  
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          In addition to neuroscientific research, the idea that ongoing internal thought was the 
‘mental baseline’ (Klinger, Marchetti & Koster, 2018) led to an expansion in cognitive research 
on spontaneous thought or mind-wandering, as it is now commonly termed (see Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015 for informative reviews). With the finding of a 
large prevalence of unconstrained thought in everyday life (see Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2011, 
Klinger & Cox, 1978), estimated at 1,300-2000 spontaneous thoughts per day (Klinger, 1990), 
much of this research aimed to first characterise the content of spontaneous thought, in addition 
to examining when, where and why these thoughts occur (e.g., Baird, Smallwood & Schooler, 
2011; Kane et al., 2007; see also a recent edited book by Fox & Christoff, 2018a). Intriguingly, 
the word ‘default’ was used across these two peaks (Klinger, 1971; Kane & McVay, 2010; 
Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 2007) suggesting that humans have unique 
neuropsychological processes that are responsible for a ‘basic’ mode of thought that is 
unintended, prevalent and relatively automatic (see Berntsen, 2012, for a similar argument 
concerning involuntary memories and future thinking). Importantly, a large number of studies on 
mind-wandering have reported that unconstrained thoughts have a tendency to be oriented to the 
person's future than the past. This prospective bias in the temporal focus of mind-wandering has 
been documented both inside (e.g., Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood, Nind & O’Connor, 2009) and 
outside (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Kaiser, Turner, Reineberg, Godinez et al., 2013) controlled 
laboratory conditions (for review, see Stawarczyk, 2018).1  
                                                 
1 It is, however, important to note that several studies, including some papers in this issue, have 
not found the prospective bias in task-unrelated spontaneous thoughts. Some of these studies 
have reported the prevalence of spontaneous thoughts about the past (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin, 
Salgado, 2015; Krans, de Bree & Moulds, 2015; Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015), while 
others have reported equal numbers of past and future thoughts (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; McVay, 
Unsworth, McMillan & Kane, 2013).  
. 
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In parallel, but often not in synergy, is research on future thinking, where the focus has 
been specifically on the cognitive processes and characteristics of future thinking (variously 
termed future mental time travel, prospection or episodic future thinking). The standard 
paradigm used in this field involves the cue-word method in which individuals voluntarily access 
their long-term memory and flexibly create plausible future events related to specific words (e.g., 
Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Irish, Addis, Hodges & 
Piguet, 2012). Using this paradigm, several influential studies within cognitive, 
neuropsychological and neuroscientific literature, have found intrinsic links between episodic 
memory and episodic future thinking, often referred to as mental time travel (Wheeler, Stuss & 
Tulving, 1997), which has been assumed to indicate common underlying neuropsychological 
processes (Addis et al., 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann 
& Maguire, 2007).2 Research on episodic future thinking has since become a ‘major growth 
industry’ (p. 65, Klein, 2013), with hundreds of published studies, several special issues (e.g., 
Cognitive Development, European Journal of Social Psychology, British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology), and two edited books (Michaelian, 
Klein & Szpunar, 2016; Oettingen, Sevincer & Gollwitzer, 2018) on the topic. We make a 
simple point: Just as we cannot comprehend human psychology from studying only males, we 
can never understand future thinking by studying only deliberate cognition. 
Echoing this sentiment, there is now a small but growing number of studies that have 
started to explore the who, when, and how questions of involuntary or spontaneous future thought 
(e.g., Cole, Staugaard & Berntsen, 2016; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Plimpton, Patel & 
                                                 
2 However, there is also a large body of research, which shows important asymmetries between 
the two process (for discussion, see Irish & Piguet, 2013; Klein 2016; Suddendorf, 2010).  
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Kvavilashvili., 2015; Vannucci, Pelagatti & Marchetti, 2017). This research has mainly evolved 
from the study of involuntary autobiographical memories, adopting its methodological tools 
(diary and lab methods) to examine its future counterpart in the form of involuntary thoughts 
about imaginary future events. The first study to systematically examine the existence and 
characteristics of spontaneous future thoughts in healthy adults was carried out in Dorthe 
Berntsen’s lab (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008) in which ‘involuntary future representations’ were 
compared with their voluntary counterparts (in addition to voluntary and involuntary memories). 
In Berntsen and Jacobsen’s study, participants were asked to (1) briefly describe a spontaneous 
future thought whenever it occurred along with completing several rating scales, (2) complete a 
detailed questionnaire on each report (this was completed retrospectively, later in the day), and 
(3) report deliberately constructed future events using the cue-word method described above. 
Results showed that spontaneous future thoughts were reported fairly frequently, often referred 
to specific events and were generally associated with feelings of mental time travel (or ‘pre-
living’). As with involuntary autobiographical memories (Berntsen, 1998), the content of the 
event was often semantically related to some aspects of the context in which it occurred.  This 
work drew largely on the concept of mental time travel, but emphasised that it could be achieved 
spontaneously. 
For further insights, we may look to different, but related, research areas, which have 
nonetheless examined forms of spontaneous future cognition. For example, the study of 
spontaneous future thought has also been embedded in research and theories of prospective 
memory, even if methods often do not permit evaluation of the ‘episodic nature’ and mental time 
travel aspect of the future thoughts (Klein, 2013; Tulving, 2005). In the field of prospective 
memory, researchers study the ability to remember to carry out an action in response to a specific 
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event or time in the future (e.g., passing on a message to colleagues at the next meeting or 
phoning a friend at 7pm tomorrow) (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
This involves several discreet stages and processes: (1) deliberately forming a representation of 
intended action and the context, in which it will be carried out, in the mind’s eye at the time of 
encoding; (2) a delay interval in which a person is engaged in other unrelated tasks, but may 
nevertheless spontaneously or deliberately think about their upcoming task, and, (3) retrieving 
and executing the intended action in response to the right event or the time (Ellis, 1996). 
Most prospective memory research has been conducted in the laboratory and focussed on 
variables affecting the retrieval of intentions when the appropriate event or time arrives, in other 
words, how the attention shifts from an ongoing task to a to-be-performed task. The influential 
multiprocess framework (originally introduced by McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; see also Scullin, 
McDaniel & Shelton, 2013) attempts to explain event-based prospective memory by indicating 
two routes to remembering an intention, one self-initiated (based on strategic search processes) 
and one spontaneous (when the intention pops into mind in response to the target event). 
However, the potential role of episodic future thinking at encoding stages of prospective memory 
tasks was emphasised as early as in 2001 by Atance and O’Neill, when they introduced the 
concept of episodic future thinking, and indeed, several studies have now demonstrated how 
future thinking at the encoding stage enhances subsequent prospective memory performance (for 
a review, see Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2019). 
Most importantly, several diary and experience sampling studies have now also 
demonstrated that in everyday life, where prospective memory tasks usually involve long 
retention intervals of hours and days, people often spontaneously experience thoughts about their 
future (as yet uncompleted) prospective memory tasks while performing other unrelated 
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activities (e.g., Anderson & McDaniel, 2019; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007; Szarras & 
Niedźwieńska, 2011; Warden, Plimpton & Kvavilashvili, this issue). The evidence for such 
spontaneous prospective memory task related thoughts has also been documented in laboratory 
studies of mind-wandering where participants are stopped intermittently during the monotonous 
and easy vigilance tasks and asked to report any thoughts they had at the time (Mazzoni, this 
issue; Plimpton et al., 2015). For a schematic diagram of how the three main fields of episodic 
future thinking, mind-wandering, and prospective memory relate to or incorporate spontaneous 
future cognition, see Figure 1. The main idea behind this diagram is that parts of the phenomena 
studied under the umbrella terms of mind-wandering and prospective memory overlap with the 
core of the phenomenon that is now being studied as the newly emerging topic of spontaneous 
future cognition, and that the field of episodic future thinking needs to incorporate research on 
both voluntary and involuntary aspects of the phenomenon.   
 Further evidence of spontaneous future thoughts can be found in the literature on 
psychological disorders (for review, see Berntsen, this issue). Since a landmark study, 
demonstrating that individuals with a history of attempted suicide, experience ‘flash-forwards’, 
representing vivid imagery of future suicide attempts (Holmes, Crane, Fennell & Williams, 
2007), clinical research focussing on spontaneous future thinking has gained momentum. For 
instance, recent studies have examined the qualities of spontaneous future thoughts in bipolar 
disorder (DiSimplico, Renner, Blackwell, Mitchell, Stratford et al., 2016), post traumatic stress 
disorder (Berntsen & Rubin, 2015), and obsessive compulsive disorder (Seli, Risko, Purdon & 
Smilek, 2016).  
-INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE- 
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By investigating spontaneous future cognition, we may be able to increase understanding 
of the psychological processes underlying spontaneous thoughts more generally and the default 
mode network with which they are associated (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, Andrews-Hanna, 
2016). Moreover, if we know that future thinking accommodates a large proportion of all 
spontaneous thoughts, and future thinking has primarily been explored in paradigms emphasising 
voluntary mechanisms, the large gap in the research (and our knowledge) becomes clear. Given 
the considerable scientific breakthroughs already evident from voluntary forms of episodic future 
thinking (e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Schacter, Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017), the opportunities for 
similar innovative findings in its spontaneous variant are now difficult to ignore. Spontaneous 
future cognition may have important, yet undiscovered, roles in specific populations (healthy or 
clinical, see Holmes et al., 2007; Hoffmann, Banzhaf, Kanske, Bermpohl & Singer, 2016, for 
initial insights on depression) and across developmental stages of life (see McCormack, Burns, 
O’Connor, Jaroslawska & Caruso, this issue; Warden et al., this issue). Spontaneous future 
cognition may also be affected in unique ways by environmental, social and personality factors. 
In establishing a special issue explicitly concerned with spontaneous future cognition, our hope 
was to energise research in this area and encourage cross-talk between areas that have operated 
relatively independently.  
Towards a Conceptual Definition 
Defining spontaneous future cognition will prove a challenge if we attempt to simply 
combine previous definitions of spontaneous thought and future thinking, because both involve 
multiple terminologies resulting from their links with unique and heterogenous research fields 
(note recent debates within the field of mind-wandering, see Christoff, Mills, Andrews-Hanna, 
Thompson, Fox et al., 2018; Seli, Kane, Smallwood, Maillet, Schooler et al., 2018; Seli, Kane, 
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Metzinger, Maillet, Schooler et al., 2018). As we are presenting a new topic of research (albeit 
arising from different academic-historical trajectories), it is important to establish basic 
principles of what spontaneous future thought is and is not. In defining this term, we outline its 
spontaneous- and future- related components, individually.  
Throughout the past fifty years of research on spontaneous thought, a multitude of terms 
have been used to describe it. Mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), daydreaming 
(Klinger & Cox, 1977-78), random episodic silent thought (Andreasen et al., 1995), task-
unrelated thought (Giambra, 1995), stimulus-independent (Antrobus,1968), and self-generated 
thought (Smallwood, 2013) have all been applied to describe spontaneous mental content and 
related phenomena. To provide a conceptual definition that encapsulates research on spontaneous 
future cognition so far, we use the most parsimonious and consensual account of spontaneous 
thought, defining the spontaneous component of future thought as unintended thought that comes 
to mind with little effort and little control over its content (see Fox & Christoff, 2018b; Klinger, 
2009). At this early stage, we see it appropriate to leave open the relevance of other aspects such 
as task-relatedness (i.e., task-related versus task-unrelated thought), stimulus-relatedness 
(stimulus-independent versus stimulus-dependent), and cuing (i.e., internal versus external, see 
Klinger et al., 2018),  as we believe that these factors may offer independent insights into the 
phenomenon (e.g., the extent to which external stimuli cues internal trains of thought that appear 
spontaneous), but are not yet central to our current working conceptualisation (in fact, they could 
be orthogonal to the spontaneous nature of future thought, in that whether a thought is cued 
internally or externally is independent of whether it is experienced as spontaneous) (see also 
Berntsen, this issue, for further discussion). Ultimately, we associate spontaneous mental 
processes with what has been termed System 1 processes, which stand in contrast to deliberate 
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mental processes (termed System 2 processes, associated with high effort, and slow, analytic 
processes, such as planning one’s weekly groceries or calculating 25 x 12. For reviews see 
Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Sripada, 2018). 
Broadly conceived, future thinking can be described as any thought that is about the 
future, which could be personal or non-personal, specific or abstract. However, researchers have 
largely concerned themselves with personal or autobiographical future scenarios, whether that be 
a future event, complete with spatio-temporal clarity (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2007; Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007) or more general, semantic or factual elements concerning one’s future (e.g., Irish 
& Piguet, 2013). Indeed, all studies in this Issue examine phenomena that are spontaneous and 
future-related, as defined here, albeit with variability in their operationalisation and forms of 
measurement.  Thus, our definition of involuntary3 or spontaneous future cognition can be 
phrased as unintended thought, related to the future, that comes to mind with little effort and 
little control over its content. We hold that this conceptual definition allows its application 
among a wide variety of studies covering mental time travel, mind-wandering, prospective 
memory and clinical disorders (but see Berntsen, this issue, who considers spontaneous future 
thinking as separate from the phenomenon of mind-wandering on the grounds that the latter can 
be intentional, while the former is by definition, unintentional). In our view, definitional clarity 
will not only strengthen our understanding of prior research, but can instigate and consolidate 
more focussed research on the topic in years to come.     
Methodology 
                                                 
3 Even though there are subtle differences in dictionary definitions of ‘involuntary’ and 
‘spontaneous’, because these phrases are used interchangeably in the literature, we adopt the 
same approach here (i.e., both denote the same phenomena when concerning the topic of the 
special issue). It is also reflected in the articles within the special issue, with some using 
involuntary and some using spontaneous when referring to the same phenomena.  
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Here, in order to contextualise studies in this Issue, we describe three prominent methods 
used to examine spontaneous thought: questionnaires, naturalistic diaries and experience 
sampling, and laboratory-based methods (see Klinger, 1978; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; 
2015 for informative reviews of measuring spontaneous thought). 
Questionnaire Methods 
 Borrowing from the individual differences approach, several studies have used a 
questionnaire method to obtain retrospective estimates and reflections on one’s experiences of 
spontaneous thoughts (e.g., Berntsen, Rubin & Salgado, 2015; Giambra, 1977; Singer & 
Antrobus, 1963). To date, validated questionnaires have focussed on various aspects of 
spontaneous thoughts, such as involuntary future thoughts (Berntsen et al., 2015), task-unrelated 
thought (Matthews, Joyner, Gilliland, Campbell, Huggins et al., 1999), daydreaming (Singer & 
Antrobus, 1963), intrusive spontaneous imagery (Berntsen & Rubin, 2015) and mind-wandering 
(Mrazek, Phillips, Franklin, Broadway & Schooler, 2013). Many of these scales are validated 
against naturalistic or laboratory methods (e.g., Mrazek et al., 2013) and provide a useful way to 
assess trait-level tendencies to experience spontaneous thoughts. However, as has been indicated 
previously (Klinger, 1978), retrospective methods rely on memory, which may fade or change 
over time, especially when dealing with such transient and dynamic cognitive processes as 
involved in spontaneous thought flow. Also, individuals may not be aware of one’s mind-
wandering tendencies, until they are probed (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Despite these 
limitations, convergent validity across on-line and retrospective methods indicate the usefulness 
of these measures. 
Naturalistic Methods 
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         One method, high in ecological validity, and often used in the study of spontaneous 
cognition, involves the measurement of spontaneous thoughts when participants are going about 
daily activities – providing real-world, real-time sampling of thoughts. Typically, in experience 
sampling studies of mind-wandering, a probe-caught method is being used, whereby participants 
carry a mobile device that ‘beeps’ at regular intervals, prompting participants to answer 
questions about the studied phenomenon at the time of the beep (Klinger, 1977-78; Killingsworth 
& Gilbert, 2010). In contrast, a self-caught method has been used in diary studies, where 
participants report the occurrence of mental phenomena as and when they occur by answering a 
questionnaire on a dairy page. Such diary methods have been very effective in providing 
essential information about the frequency and nature of involuntary memories and involuntary 
future thoughts in everyday life (e.g. Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; D’Argembeau, Renaud, Van 
der Linden, 2011; Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2011). 
Laboratory Methods 
From its beginnings, the use of laboratory methods has been popular in research on 
spontaneous thoughts, as one is able to assess effects of manipulating task variables upon the 
frequency and characteristics of thoughts (see Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Laboratory studies 
of spontaneous thoughts involve tasks designed as convenient analogues to mimic daily tasks in 
which the mind wanders (e.g., driving, Antrobus et al., 1966). Such methods have proved 
particularly valuable in examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying the occurrence of mind-
wandering experiences, in particular the effect of mind-wandering on concurrent task 
performance (see Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Kane & McVay, 2012). A range of cognitive 
tasks have been utilised, including vigilance tasks (e.g., signal detection tasks, Antrobus et 
al.,1966; line detection tasks, Plimpton et al., 2015, see also Giambra, 1995), reading tasks 
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(Schooler, Reichle, and Halpern, 2005), go/no-go tasks (e.g., the Sustained Attention to Response 
Task, or SART, Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley & Yiend, 1997; McVay & Kane, 2009), 
or choice reaction time tasks (Baird et al., 2011). In addition, O’Callaghan and colleagues have 
recently developed a novel shape expectations task, which may be particularly useful in studying 
spontaneous thoughts in ageing and clinical populations (O’Callaghan, Shine, Lewis, Andrews-
Hanna, & Irish, 2015; O’Callaghan, Shine, Hodges, Andrews-Hanna, & Irish, 2019) (see also 
Irish, Goldberg, Alaeddin, O’Callaghan & Andrews-Hanna, this issue). Generally, tasks that 
require rapid perceptual processing (e.g., fast presentation rate, see Antrobus et al., 1966) and tax 
cognitive resources (see McVay & Kane, 2009) reduce frequencies of spontaneous thought, 
although how this relates to spontaneous future thought is an open question (but is addressed in 
Mazzoni, this issue, and Barzykowski, Radel, Niedźwieńska & Kvavilashvili, this issue; see also 
Smallwood et al., 2009). 
At outset, it is important to clarify a key consideration within laboratory studies: Whether 
to use a self-caught or probe-caught method (as outlined in the highly-cited review by 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).4 To characterise and examine the implications of these methods, 
we will explain them in an example of a vigilance task – a task that has been adopted in both first 
and second ‘peaks’ to capture and study spontaneous thought (Antrobus et al., 1966; Giambra, 
1995; Plimpton et al., 2015). Vigilance tasks involve maintaining continuous attention in the 
service of detecting signals or stimuli which occur in an unpredictable sequence. The participant 
is presented with a continuous sequence of hundreds of slides (e.g., 600), each shown briefly 
(e.g., 1.5 or 2 seconds). In addition, verbal phrases (e.g., ‘lucky find’, ‘coffee jar’) are embedded 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that this distinction also applies to naturalistic studies, but we focus on 
laboratory studies here as the majority of studies in this special issue employ laboratory 
paradigms (but see Beaty, Seli & Schacter, this issue; Warden et al., this issue). 
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on each slide (or some of the slides), as they have been shown to reliably trigger spontaneous 
thoughts (e.g., see Cole et al., 2016; Mazzoni, Vannucci & Batool, 2014; McVay & Kane, 2013; 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). The primary task involves identifying infrequently-presented 
targets (vertical line arrays) among frequently-presented non-targets (horizontal line arrays). A 
secondary aspect involves recording thoughts that arise at points throughout the task. If 
participants are asked to monitor their thoughts and report when spontaneous thoughts occur, 
they will be using the self-caught method. The advantage of this method is that, by using 
informative descriptions, only certain psychological phenomena directly of interest (e.g., 
involuntary future projections, Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008) are noticed and recorded by 
participants. The explicit nature of this method also allows one to explore the latency between 
stimuli and the thoughts that are cued by it (see Cole et al., 2016). This method is limited, 
however, by increasing the level of self-monitoring processes than would be normally expected 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), which may alter the characteristics and frequency of certain 
recorded thoughts (Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti & Mazzoni, 2014; see also Barzykowski & 
Niedźwieńska, 2016; Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2018). Self-caught recording may also be 
affected by social desirability, because participants are informed about the nature of thoughts that 
the researcher is interested in. This may be particularly problematic in ageing research given the 
higher levels of social desirability in older adults (cf. Jordão, Ferreira-Santos, Pinho & St. 
Jacques, 2019).   
Alternatively, in the probe-caught method, participants are asked to classify or describe 
any thought/s they had before being stopped by a specific signal or probe (for a review of 
different types of probes used, see Weinstein, 2018). Probes in such studies are typically set at 
random/pseudo-random sequences by the researcher, in part, to prevent participants from 
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predicting when they will occur. In contrast to the self-caught method, this method has the 
benefit of catching spontaneous thoughts as they occur naturally, requiring less self-monitoring, 
and thus may be seen as a purer form of ‘experience sampling’ of one’s ongoing stream of 
thought (see Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). This method also removes a requirement necessary 
in self-caught methods to inform participants of the phenomena under investigation (see 
Vannucci et al., 2014 and Smallwood & Schooler 2006, for further discussion). It is also worth 
noting that while the results obtained from the probe-caught method have received validation 
from objective measures (e.g., eye movements in both young and older adults, see Frank et al. 
2015), self-caught reporting is often unrelated to behavioural measures of mind-wandering 
(Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007, 2008). However, the disadvantage of the probe-
caught method is that it can lead to very low frequencies of thoughts (per person) with some 
participants excluded for a lack of specific types of thought (e.g., 0-4 per thought type, see 
Plimpton et al., 2015; Vannucci et al., 2017), resulting in sparse participant-level data. 
All three types of methods described above, have been used in the studies included in this 
issue, and several new variations of existing methods have also been reported to enable 
researchers to study spontaneous future thinking in very young children (Caza & Atance, this 
issue), older children and adolescents (McCormack et al., this issue) and older adults inside the 
laboratory (Jordão et al., this issue) and in everyday life (Warden et al., this issue). The 
development of new methods and techniques will inevitably stimulate further research on 
spontaneous future thinking (see e.g., O’Callaghan et al., 2015; Irish et al., this issue).  
 The Present: Major Themes and Content of the Special Issue 
When introducing any new concept or topic of investigation, it is natural and theoretically 
relevant to make direct comparisons with other well-developed concepts, and satellite research 
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areas to demonstrate both its construct and discriminant validity. The field of spontaneous future 
cognition has followed this trend, with all articles in this issue making direct comparisons with 
related concepts, such as involuntary memory or spontaneous mind-wandering about the past on 
the one hand, and voluntary episodic future thinking, on the other (see Table 1). For instance, 
some researchers have compared spontaneous thoughts about the future with involuntary 
autobiographical  memories to illustrate the potential similarities between involuntary past and 
future mental time travel (e.g., Barzykowski et al., this issue; Mazzoni, this issue), in step with 
earlier studies by Berntsen and Jacobsen (2008) and Cole et al. (2016). Others have compared 
spontaneous future thoughts with voluntary episodic future thinking to show potential 
differences between voluntary and involuntary processes (e.g., Caza & Atance, this issue), while 
Warden et al. (this issue, Study 2) have made comparisons across all four categories of thought 
illustrated in Table 1. 
                                             INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
These comparisons have resulted in several interesting insights, which can enhance the 
understanding of where spontaneous future cognition stands in relation to other related 
phenomena, and encourage crosstalk between currently separate research fields depicted in 
Figure 1, a sentiment that is also expressed in the first of the papers presented in this issue by 
Berntsen. In her review paper, Berntsen provides a definition of spontaneous future cognition 
and illustrates how different manifestations of future thoughts (in terms of their content) have 
been studied within the fields of mind-wandering, spontaneous episodic future thinking and in 
psychopathology. She provides a comprehensive overview of maladaptive or dysfunctional 
future thoughts in individuals with addictions, various forms of anxiety disorders and 
persecutory delusions, as well as in post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. The fact that 
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these thoughts are spontaneous and difficult to control demonstrates the importance and potential 
role of spontaneous future cognitions in the development and maintenance of these disorders (an 
overlooked question in research and clinical practice), and will undoubtedly stimulate more 
research on clinical populations in future. 
In relation to mind-wandering, Berntsen puts forward the view that research conducted 
on future oriented mind-wandering may not be tapping into spontaneous episodic future thinking 
because of a number of methodological and conceptual issues in terms of how mind-wandering 
has been defined and studied so far, and recent findings showing that a substantial amount of 
mind-wandering episodes are initiated intentionally. While we share Berntsen’s concerns, there 
is ample evidence that the field of mind-wandering has entered into a new phase by introducing 
the distinctions between intentional vs. unintentional (e.g., Seli, Risko, Smilek & Schacter, 2016) 
and stimulus dependent vs. stimulus independent mind-wandering (e.g., Maillet, Seli & Schacter, 
2017). With these distinctions and improved methodologies tapping into the precise content of 
thoughts (e.g., Irish et al., this issue; Warden et al., this issue), we believe that research on future 
oriented mind-wandering and spontaneous episodic future thinking will have much in common 
in terms of conceptual understanding and experimental findings. This is nicely reflected in the 
papers included in this special issue coming from different traditions of research on mind-
wandering (e.g., Irish et al.; McCormack, et al.; Ji et al.) and spontaneous mental time travel or 
future thinking (e.g., Mazzonni; Vannuci et al.; Jordão et al.). Finally, Berntsen provides an 
interesting re-analysis of temporal distribution of spontaneous past and future episodic thoughts 
from her three published studies, and shows that future thoughts refer to events/scenarios in more 
immediate future compared to thoughts about the past. This asymmetry is explained by the 
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potential relationship of spontaneous future thoughts with people’s goals and current concerns 
that are important for guiding one’s behaviours in more immediate than distant future.        
The remaining articles included in this special issue are empirical and largely fall into one 
of three broad themes, reflecting the existing and emerging research trends within the study of 
spontaneous future cognition. As will become clear, the section on Underlying cognitive 
mechanisms aids understanding of the section on Development across the lifespan, and 
developmental research can itself feed back into understanding of basic cognitive underpinnings. 
We conclude with studies which focus on individual differences and how Psychopathology is 
related to spontaneous future thinking, informing clinical models and the understanding of 
spontaneous cognitive phenomena in general. 
Underlying cognitive mechanisms 
 One key finding that has consistently emerged in relation to spontaneous cognition is that 
spontaneous thoughts are more likely to be experienced during undemanding habitual cognitive 
activities (e.g., Antrobus et al., 1966; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Smallwood et al., 2009; 
Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, & Chiorri, 2019). In addition, research on involuntary 
autobiographical memories and spontaneous future thinking has shown that the majority of such 
thoughts are triggered by easily identifiable external and internal cues (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 
2008; Cole et al., 2016; Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2008; Mace, 2004). Given that in everyday 
life, people spend substantial amounts of time carrying out habitual cognitively-undemanding 
activities (e.g., Ellis & Nimmo-Smith, 1993) and are exposed to a myriad of cues, one key 
question that arises in relation to spontaneous past and future thinking is why we are not 
constantly flooded by such thoughts in daily life. Two papers in this special issue by 
Barzykowski et al., and by Mazzoni, directly address this question, using a similar experimental 
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paradigm (adapted from Plimpton et al., 2015), but manipulating different variables. For 
example, Barzykowski, et al.’s study tested the idea that it is the constantly operating inhibitory 
mechanism that normally keeps these thoughts ‘at bay’, and that depleting inhibitory resources 
(with a 60 min Stroop task with high percentage of incongruent trials) would enhance the 
number of spontaneous future (and past) thoughts recorded by participants during the 
undemanding vigilance task, compared to control participants who did not perform the Stroop 
task, or participants who performed an easy Stroop task (with 100% congruent trials). Despite 
the evidence of inhibitory resources being depleted in the experimental group, the results showed 
that the number of spontaneous future thoughts was largely unaffected by the depletion 
manipulation.  
The research by Mazzoni, on the other hand, examined the role of perceptual (or 
cognitive) load on the number of task-unrelated thoughts about the future and the past during the 
undemanding vigilance task. The experiment was a conceptual replication and extension of a 
previous study by Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, and Paccani (2015) on 
involuntary autobiographical memories, which showed that presenting irrelevant cue words (or 
cue words and simple arithmetic calculations) on 2/3 of the trials during the vigilance task, 
significantly reduced the number of reported involuntary memories, in comparison to a condition 
in which participants were presented with irrelevant cue words in only 20% of trials. This is an 
important finding, because it suggests that although cue words are important for triggering 
spontaneous thoughts, many cues may not be better than fewer cues because they also 
inadvertently increase the demand for available cognitive resources for processing distracter 
information within the vigilance task (i.e., despite instructions to ignore the irrelevant cues, 
participants will still be engaged in reading the words and/or checking the correctness of 
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arithmetic calculations). It is also noteworthy, that while the frequent presentation of distracter 
information (in the form of irrelevant words or arithmetic calculations) does not have any 
detrimental effect on performance on the actual vigilance task (i.e., the number of detected 
targets), their presence is sufficient to interfere with the formation of and/or reporting of 
involuntary autobiographical memories (for similar findings on involuntary musical imagery, see 
Floridou, Williamson & Stewart, 2017).5  
Using different task parameters (e.g., fewer trials and a probe caught method), Mazzoni 
(this issue) wanted to find if similar results could be obtained for involuntary future thoughts. 
Results showed that although both past memories and future thoughts were more often reported 
in the condition with fewer cue phrases, the detrimental effect of frequent cues (or cues plus 
arithmetic calculations) in reducing spontaneous thoughts was significantly larger for future 
thoughts than past memories. This could suggest that despite their spontaneous nature, the 
appearance of future thoughts in participants’ minds is a more resource demanding process than 
the spontaneous retrieval of past events. However, when spontaneous future thoughts were 
separated into thoughts about future plans and imaginary future scenarios (see also Anderson & 
McDaniel, 2019, Plimpton et al., 2015, Warden et al., this issue, who used a similar coding 
scheme to categorise the content of spontaneous future thoughts), the results showed that the 
detrimental effect of perceptual load manipulation on future thoughts was mainly due to a 
                                                 
5 One way to explain this interesting finding, based on mind-wandering research, is to interpret it 
as an effect of perceptual (Forster & Lavie, 2009) and not cognitive load (e.g., McVay et al., 
2013). Thus, the number of spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts may decrease not only because 
our resources are engaged in a demanding cognitive task, but also because an external stimulus is 
perceptually salient and disrupts the internal train of thought (i.e., causes an external shift of 
attention; Smallwood, 2013), even if it does not make the task more difficult. In other words, it is 
possible that even relatively undemanding tasks may disrupt mind-wandering if they include 
perceptually salient stimuli.  
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markedly stronger reduction in the number of reported future scenarios than future plans. This 
novel finding demonstrates the importance of distinguishing different types of spontaneous 
future thoughts, and raises an interesting possibility that spontaneous thoughts about upcoming 
plans may be less constructive and more similar to involuntary autobiographical memories (i.e., 
their representations are already formed and get simply re-activated by incidental cues in the 
environment). 
The question about how much constructive and/or cognitively resource-demanding 
processing is involved in spontaneous future cognition, is of course a key but as yet unanswered 
question. The effortless and quick appearance in mind of spontaneous future thoughts, as 
demonstrated by Cole et al. (2016), suggests that they may be relying on similar types of 
associative spreading activation processes as documented in research on involuntary 
autobiographical memories and mind-wandering (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2018; Mace, 
2005; McVay et al., 2013; Baird et al., 2011). The question about how nonconscious processes 
may lead to spontaneous future thoughts coming to mind is addressed in two papers by Jordão, 
Pinho and St. Jacques (this issue) and Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri and Brugger (this issue). 
Jordão et al. developed a new simplified version of the standard vigilance task in which 
participants were processing the words rather than the lines to detect infrequent target words 
printed in yellow, in a stream of slides with words printed in red. Given that vigilance tasks with 
words have been shown to result in higher numbers of spontaneous thoughts about the past than 
future (Cole et al., 2016; Plimpton et al., 2015; Vannucci et al., 2017), Jordão et al. wanted to test 
if the activation of participants’ existing goals and current concerns would increase spontaneous 
future thoughts in the vigilance task. Additionally, the effect of age on the nature and frequency 
of spontaneous cognition under these task parameters was also investigated (see below the 
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section on Development across the life span). The results showed that young participants 
reported significantly higher number of spontaneous future thoughts in the second than the first 
half of the vigilance task, after they had completed a brief card sorting task between the two parts 
of the vigilance task (designed to activate participants’ current concerns and life goals). 
Moreover, the number of spontaneous future thoughts in the second half of the task was 
significantly higher than in control participants, who were exposed to the same card sorting task 
with instructions that did not lead to goal activation, while no group differences were present in 
the first half of the task. Thus, the priming manipulation was successful, and the results 
demonstrate that it is possible to increase spontaneous future thinking without participants 
explicitly listing their existing unfinished projects and current concerns. 
Finally, Vannucci et al. (this issue) went a step further in testing subtle priming effects by 
assessing if the occurrence of past and future thoughts could be sometimes triggered by abstract 
perceptual cues – that ‘push’ them toward the past or the future. Taking inspiration from studies 
demonstrating effects of perception on the temporal direction of thought (e.g., Santiago et al., 
2007) and the concept of the “mental time line” (flowing left to right in visual space), they 
showed that detecting target slides (with straight lines) in a stream of  slides with rightward 
facing arrows increased spontaneous future thoughts, while leftward facing arrows increased 
spontaneous thoughts about the past. These findings provide insights into how humans are 
unknowingly ‘primed’ by aspects of visual space, and imply an unnerving possibility that the 
content of our spontaneous thought can be ‘nudged’ towards past or future by incidental stimuli 
or perceptions in everyday life.        
Development across the life span 
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Currently, evidence in relation to age effects on involuntary cognitions is mixed (for a 
review, see Maillet & Schacter, 2016), with studies of involuntary autobiographical memories 
showing small age effects (e.g., Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz & Kvavilashvili, 2009) or the 
absence of age effects (Berntsen, Rasmussen, Miles, Nielsen & Ramsgaard, 2017) when 
comparing the number and characteristics of reported involuntary memories in young and old 
participants in the laboratory and everyday life (see also Gardner & Ascoli, 2016). In contrast, 
research on mind-wandering has resulted in significant negative age effects by showing that 
older adults report fewer instances of task-unrelated thoughts when engaged in vigilance or 
reading tasks (for reviews of these studies, see Jordão, Ferreira-Santos et al., 2019; Maillet & 
Schacter, 2016). In light of these discrepancies, and the absence of research on spontaneous 
future cognitions across the life span, especially at opposite ends of the developmental spectrum, 
it is perhaps not surprising that three papers, in this issue, examined young and older adults’ 
ability to experience spontaneous future cognitions with novel laboratory and experience 
sampling methods (Jordão et al.; Irish et al.; and Warden et al.), while papers by Caza and 
Atance compared spontaneous future cognition in young children and McCormack et al. - in 
children, adolescents and young adults. Research on ageing and development of spontaneous 
cognition in children is also important theoretically, as it can provide further information about 
the potential mechanisms involved in the occurrence of spontaneous future thoughts. Indeed, if 
these thoughts are mediated by automatic spreading activation processes similar to processes 
involved in the retrieval of involuntary autobiographical memories, then one would expect an 
absence of age effects or relatively small age effects in comparison to what has been found in 
studies of voluntary episodic future thinking (for a review, see Schacter, Gaesser & Addis, 
2013). 
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One of the aims of the study reported by Jordão et al. described earlier, was to develop a 
new version of the vigilance task that would elicit sufficient numbers of spontaneous task-
unrelated thoughts in older adults. This was motivated by unpublished findings by Schlagman 
and colleagues (see Kvavilashvili, Niedźwieńska, & Kliegel, 2016), showing that a large 
proportion of older adults (58%) did not report any involuntary autobiographical memories in the 
original version of the vigilance task with line patterns and incidental cue words used by 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008). When queried after the task, older adults reported that the 
task was quite difficult in that they had to constantly suppress the irrelevant words in order to 
concentrate on the lines. Despite these self-reported differences in task difficulty, the actual 
performance on the vigilance task was at ceiling and not significantly different across age 
groups. To make the task parameters ageing-friendly, Jordão et al., presented participants with 
single words on the screen and participants had to indicate the occurrence of words printed in 
yellow and ignore the words in red. This manipulation reduced the need for participants to get 
distracted by irrelevant cue words, present in the standard version of the task. Perhaps most 
importantly, the task was made really easy (and boring) by presenting each word for 3 seconds 
and having a 7-second long inter-stimulus interval. Finally, the probe-caught method was used, 
to eliminate the need to monitor the consciousness for spontaneous thoughts. Under these new 
task parameters, no significant age effects were obtained in the number of spontaneous thoughts 
about the future and the past. 
In line with these findings, Warden et al. also found no significant age effects in the 
number of recorded spontaneous thoughts about the past and the future in a naturalistic 1-day 
experience sampling study in which participants recorded their current thoughts in response to 30 
signals emitted by a wrist watch. Moreover, Warden et al., did not find the prospective bias in 
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the number of spontaneous thoughts recorded (i.e., the number of future thoughts was not higher 
than past thoughts). However, the prospective bias was present for a significant minority of 
deliberate task-unrelated thoughts, suggesting that the prospective bias in mind-wandering 
studies could be at least partly explained by instances of intentional mind-wandering about the 
future (Seli et al., 2016). Taken together, findings from these two studies using laboratory and 
naturalistic methods appear to be replicating the results of Berntsen et al. (2017) on involuntary 
autobiographical memories, which also showed that older adults did not differ from young 
participants in the number of reported involuntary autobiographical memories in the laboratory 
(Study 1) and in everyday life (Study 2).  
However, significant negative age effects in the number of reported spontaneous past and 
future thoughts were obtained in the study of Irish et al. (this issue). Their study was partly 
motivated by similar concerns as those expressed by Jordão et al., specifically, that negative age 
effects obtained in mind-wandering studies could be due to the cognitively demanding nature of 
the go/no-go and reading tasks used in studies of ageing and mind-wandering. To minimise the 
ongoing task difficulty for older adults, Irish et al. used their new method with no vigilance 
component, the shape expectations task (see O’Callaghan et al., 2015), in which participants 
observe simple shapes for various lengths of time, and at the end of each trial, are asked to report 
what was currently going through their mind. Their thought reports were subsequently 
categorised by researchers into four different categories ranging from 1 (fully on task) to 4 (fully 
off task or task-unrelated). The results showed that despite the cognitively undemanding nature 
of the task, older participants still reported significantly fewer task-unrelated thoughts (Level 4 
responses). In addition, while younger adults reported significantly more future than past 
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thoughts (confirming the prospective bias in mind-wandering), older adults showed the opposite 
pattern (more past than future thoughts). 
Given that both Jordão et al. and Irish et al. used such simple undemanding tasks, the 
absence and presence of age effects in spontaneous future thoughts in the two studies, 
respectively, is striking. However, one of the main differences between the tasks was the 
presence of cue words in the study by Jordão et al. and the absence of meaningful material (only 
geometric shapes) in the study by Irish et al. It is therefore possible, that the combination of 
undemanding ongoing tasks with distracting meaningful material is necessary to eliminate age 
effects on spontaneous past and future thinking, conditions which may be present in everyday 
life, and resulted in the absence of age effects in the study by Warden et al. (cf. Gardner & 
Ascoli, 2016; but see Maillet et al., 2018). Clearly, examining the role of cues (their presence vs. 
absence) in eliciting spontaneous thoughts about the future during undemanding tasks used by 
Jordão et al. and Irish et al. will be a very interesting avenue for future research. 
Similar issues concerning the need for equating the difficulty of ongoing (vigilance) tasks 
in different age groups arise in relation to studying spontaneous future (and past) thoughts in 
children, and especially in very young children who may also have difficulties in meta-awareness 
or noticing and reporting spontaneous thoughts - more so than older adults (e.g., see Chen, 2013, 
cited in Ye, Song, Zhang & Wang, 2014). Because of these difficulties, there are currently less 
than a handful studies on mind-wandering in older children and adolescents (e.g., Ye et al., 2014; 
Van den Driessche et al., 2017; Stawarczyk et al., 2014; Zhang, Song, Ye & Wang, 2013), with 
virtually no developmental studies on children’s spontaneous future thinking. The studies 
reported by McCormack et al. and Caza and Atance in this issue are therefore starting to fill this 
gap in the literature by developing and testing new methods that have resulted in important new 
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insights on children’s spontaneous future thinking ability and its relationship with its voluntary 
counterpart.  
Caza and Atance studied 3-, 4-, and 5-year old children’s spontaneous and deliberate 
(prompted) episodic future thinking by using a ‘two room’ task (see Atance, Louw, & Clayton, 
2015) in which children spent brief periods of time in two different rooms with and without toys 
(or food - smarties). At the end of the session, in the adjacent hall, children were told that they 
would be visiting the rooms again tomorrow. They were then shown new toys (or smarties) and 
asked which room they would like these toys to be placed during their future visit (correct 
answer would be the room with no toys or no smarties). 
Results showed that in this deliberate future thinking test, children were more likely to 
provide a correct answer in the food than the toys condition, and 3-year olds were outperformed 
by 4- and 5- year olds, who did not differ from each other. However, the novel aspect of the 
study was that children’s spontaneous verbal utterances about the future and past were recorded 
and the spontaneous ‘solutions’ of the future thinking task noted (e.g., if at any point a child 
mentioned that toys or the food needed to be moved to an empty room). Results showed that 
there were no age effects in the amount of spontaneous future utterances across the three age 
groups, nor in the spontaneous solutions of the future thinking test (although the rate of such 
solutions was low across all age groups especially in the food condition).   
McCormack et al. also compared deliberate and spontaneous future thinking using two 
new tasks for assessing these constructs and testing 6-7 year olds, 9-10 year olds, 14-15 year olds 
and adults. The deliberate episodic future thinking task was unusual in that participants, after 
careful briefing, were free to produce either a past memory or a future event/scenario in response 
to each of the 10 words. These instructions would presumably favour more ‘direct’ or 
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spontaneous retrieval or construction of events than standard versions of episodic future task (see 
also Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016). Under these modified task instructions, the results 
showed a clear dominance for past than future events in all age groups and, surprisingly, no 
significant age effects in the number of past and future thoughts produced. The same participants 
also completed an undemanding and engaging colouring-in task, which was interrupted by 
intermittent thought probes to examine whether participants were on or off task by thinking 
about the past or future. In line with the findings from the cue word task, no age effects were 
obtained in the total number of on-task or off-task thoughts, suggesting that the colouring-in task 
was equally easy and engaging for all age groups. Importantly, however, there was an age by 
temporal focus interaction, with a clear prevalence of future thoughts than past thoughts in adults 
but not in any other groups. In other words, the prospective bias in mind-wandering was not 
found in children or adolescents in this study. However, as in many other mind-wandering 
studies, the intentionality of the past and future task-unrelated thoughts was not assessed in this 
task (presumably because younger children could struggle to distinguish such thoughts), and it is 
therefore possible that the prospective bias in adults was due to them having greater numbers of 
deliberate thoughts about the future compared to children and adolescents (see e.g., Warden et 
al., this issue). 
Taken together, findings from Caza and Atance and McCormack et al. replicate and 
extend the results of studies on spontaneous episodic memories in young children, which also 
show small or no age effects and suggest that both past and future spontaneous thoughts may be 
a precursor of more deliberate forms of mental time travel in everyday life (cf. Krøjgaard, Kingo, 
Jensen & Berntsen, 2017). It is obvious that future research should investigate in more detail 
similarities and differences between the developmental trajectories of deliberate and spontaneous 
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future thinking while, at the same time, comparing it to the deliberate and spontaneous recall of 
past events.   
Individual differences and psychopathology  
One interesting finding that has emerged from numerous studies on involuntary 
autobiographical memories and mind-wandering is that there are usually large individual 
differences in people’s propensity to experience and report involuntary memories and task-
unrelated thoughts. Moreover, their experience has been related to various measures of 
personality, mood and psychopathology (e.g., Jones & Steel., 2012; Krans, de Bree, & Moulds, 
2015; Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & Alloy, 2016; Poerio, Totterdell & Miles, 2013). Although 
research on this topic in relation to spontaneous future thoughts is scarce, Berntsen’s (this issue) 
comprehensive review demonstrates that spontaneous future thoughts may be crucially important 
in providing new insights about existing clinical disorders and for the development of new 
interventions. Emphasis on the importance of individual differences in spontaneous future 
cognitions and psychopathology has been reflected by the inclusion into the Special Issue of 
three papers on this topic by del Palacio-Gonzalez and Berntsen, by Beaty, Seli and Schacter, 
and by Ji, Holmes, MacLeod and Murphy which used questionnaire, naturalistic experience 
sampling and laboratory methods, respectively.    
 The paper by del Palacio-Gonzalez and Berntsen reports three large-scale correlational 
studies on American (Studies 1 and 3) and Danish (Study 2) samples whose tendency to 
experience spontaneous thoughts about the past and the future were assessed by a recently 
developed Involuntary Autobiographical Memory Inventory (IAMI; Berntsen, Rubin & Salgado, 
2015). The primary focus in this exploratory study was on people’s tendency to suppress 
unwanted thoughts (measured by the White Bear Suppression Inventory, Wegner & Zanakos, 
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1994), and its relation to spontaneous past and future mental time travel while controlling for 
ruminative thinking (brooding and reflection subscales), emotion regulation, mind-wandering 
and positive/negative daydreaming styles. Across all three studies, thought suppression scores 
significantly predicted higher scores on involuntary past and future thinking above and beyond 
indices of rumination and emotion regulation, even when controlling for participants’ scores on 
mind-wandering and positive and negative daydreaming styles (Study 3). These findings are 
interesting because thought suppression has been linked to intrusive and negative thoughts often 
present in various clinical disorders, but it also appears to be linked with attempts to control 
more benign (and non-repetitive) spontaneous everyday past and future thoughts. The results 
also replicated and significantly extended the findings by Berntsen et al. (2015) by showing that 
while participants reported having spontaneous thoughts about the past more frequently than 
spontaneous thoughts about the future (for similar findings with a structured interview method, 
see Krans et al., 2015), scores on both sub-scales were highly correlated. 
 The aim of Beaty et al.’s study was to examine people’s tendency to experience past and 
future thoughts in everyday life and their relation to emotional biases in thinking styles that are 
either past-oriented and negative (brooding rumination), or future-oriented and positive 
(optimism). An experience sampling method was used in which participants’ thoughts (their 
temporal focus and phenomenological characteristics) were assessed during random calls eight 
times a day over a one week period. Results showed that participants who scored high on 
brooding rumination (but not on self-reflection) reported more past-oriented thoughts in 
everyday life, even when controlling for depression scores, and had reduced ratings of vividness 
for both past and future thoughts. In contrast, optimism scores did not predict rates of either past 
or future thinking, but those high in optimism had more vivid and more positive future thoughts, 
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but no such effects were observed for the characteristics of past thoughts.  This pattern of 
findings only partially replicates the findings reported by del Palacio-Gonzalez and Berntsen 
(this issue), who found that both measures of rumination (brooding and reflection) predicted 
scores on both the past and future subscales of IAMI in Studies 1 and 3. Moreover, unlike del 
Palacio-Gonzalez and Berntsen (this issue), Beaty et al. did not find any differences in the rates 
of reported thoughts about the past and the future (see also Warden et al., this issue). Similarities 
across studies indicates that brooding rumination may be an important variable that needs to be 
investigated in more depth in relation to past and future mental time travel, while discrepancies 
highlight the importance of using complementary and diverse methods of enquiry, that enable the 
investigation of spontaneous phenomena in real time both in everyday life and in the laboratory. 
 Finally, the study by Ji et al. (this issue), examined the relationship between dysphoria, 
representational format (imagery vs. verbal) and the valence of self-caught spontaneous future-
oriented thoughts, using a novel version of the go/no-go task in which participants were also 
exposed to irrelevant, auditorily-presented cue words. Compared to existing laboratory studies of 
spontaneous future thought (e.g., Mazzoni, this issue; Barzykowski et al, this issue) and those 
assessing dysphoria (Plimpton et al., 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2016), the novelty of this study was 
twofold: (a) it examined the reduced positivity bias in dysphoria by calculating the relative 
frequency of positive and negative future thoughts and (b) it decoupled verbal and imagery 
components of future thoughts. Further, although negatively-charged mental imagery has been 
associated with anxiety-related disorders, the relevance of spontaneous imagery to mood has 
been highlighted only recently (e.g., Hoffman et al., 2016). The findings indicated a specific role 
of imagery (versus verbal representations) in the reduced positive future thinking found in 
dysphoria.  
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In some ways, this is not a surprising result. As Ji and colleagues indicate, high levels of 
sensory-perceptual detail (e.g., simulating the embarrassment of a future failure) are linked with 
the degree to which an imagined scenario feels like genuine perceptual experience, and increases 
feelings of mental time travel (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012), thereby increasing the 
emotional ‘impact’ of the image (Barsics, Van der Linden & D’Argembeau, 2016). What is 
surprising here, however, is that emotionally-laden scenarios can operate in an unbidden way. 
Although previous findings have shown negatively skewed future thoughts in emotional 
disorders using deliberate construction of future scenarios (e.g., Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, 
Rose & MacLeod, 1996), in Ji et al.’s study, a more basic mode of negative future thinking is 
described. These findings may have implications for understanding its clinical import and inform 
therapies, where the focus directly involves imagery (e.g., imagery rescripting). Further, such a 
system may require revision of cognitive explanations of depression which have been based 
upon deliberate event construction (e.g., MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; Williams et al., 1996).   
 The Future: Implications, Challenges and Directions  
Here, we bring together this Editorial with reference to four possible questions: (a) when 
do spontaneous future thoughts occur; (b) how do they come to mind; (c) who is more likely to 
experience them, and finally, (d) why do we experience them at all? For each question, we 
review the challenges and directions within the field (see also Berntsen, this issue). 
When and how do spontaneous future thoughts occur? 
As stated above, an ongoing question is whether we can understand when spontaneous 
future thoughts arise by examining systematic effects of task demands and external cues. A key 
question in relation to cuing is if (or how), the stimuli we experience and perceive in everyday 
life - knowingly or unknowingly - influence our spontaneous thoughts about the future. 
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Preliminary evidence from laboratory vigilance tasks and experience sampling studies appears to 
suggest that spontaneous future thoughts may be less reliant on external cues than involuntary 
autobiographical memories. For example, in vigilance tasks with no verbal cues clear prospective 
bias in spontaneous thoughts has been found in several studies (Vannucci et al., 2017; see 
Stawarczyk, 2018 for a review), and in a naturalistic experience sampling study, Warden et al. 
(this issue) showed that, in comparison to spontaneous thoughts about the past, spontaneous 
thoughts about the future were slightly less dependent of external triggers (i.e., participants 
reported instances of external, internal and no triggers with equal frequency) (for other real-
world studies where internally and externally cued thoughts were assessed, see Berntsen & 
Jacobsen, 2008; D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2011)6.  
The findings that fairly large proportions of spontaneous future thoughts are reported by 
participants as having no known cue (20-30%, Cole et al., 2016; Jordão et al., this issue; 
Vannucci et al., this issue; Warden et al., this issue), or being triggered by internal thoughts (11% 
Mazzoni, this issue), or ‘other’ antecedents (12-15%, Cole et al., 2016; Jordão et al., this issue) 
are seemingly intractable to research involving certain experimental manipulations within 
vigilance tasks, and present a theoretical challenge: what are the cognitive origins of these 
spontaneous future thoughts and what affects their content and occurrence?7  
One possible explanation of this pattern of findings is that external cues may interact with 
the spontaneity of future thoughts such that in the absence of meaningful external cues 
                                                 
6 These studies are important as common findings from cue/task manipulations indicate that 
mind-wandering and mental time travel may be interpreted together and suggest that factors that 
influence their occurrence in the laboratory map on to how they arise in the real world – a critical 
aspect of cognitive science (Neisser, 1985; see also Kingston, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008; 
Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004). 
7 Spontaneous future thoughts unrelated to external cues may also be relevant to maladaptive 
forms of spontaneous future cognition (see Berntsen, this issue). 
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participants may be more likely to engage in future thoughts deliberately rather than 
spontaneously (e.g., see Seli, Ralph, Konishi, Smilek & Schacter, 2017). To address this issue, a 
more general recommendation for future empirical studies of spontaneous future thoughts is that 
researchers include a measure of spontaneity, either as a dichotomous variable (Plimpton et al., 
2015) or along a continuous scale (see Ji et al., this issue), as even if thoughts are task-unrelated, 
this does not always equate to spontaneousness (see Seli et al., 2017). If such measures are not 
included, as was the case for several studies in the special issue, assumptions that thoughts are 
truly spontaneous are difficult to verify post-hoc.  
We have also observed how manipulating aspects of tasks before (Jordão et al., this issue; 
Barzykowski et al., this issue) or during (Mazzoni, this issue; Vannucci et al., this issue) the 
recording of spontaneous future thoughts not only affects their frequency, but also their content 
(Mazzoni, this issue) and temporal focus (Vannucci et al.). Theoretical progress has been made 
in the field of mind-wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) and 
prospective memory (Scullin, McDaniel & Shelton, 2013), and it is important that attempts are 
made to apply these to the area of spontaneous future cognition. For instance, studies have 
shown that increasing cognitive load in ongoing tasks decreases mind-wandering and prospective 
memory and we have observed similar findings related to spontaneous future cognition (see 
Mazzoni, this issue). We therefore recapitulate that a synergistic approach, capitalising on 
findings from mind-wandering, future thinking and prospective memory, outlined above, may be 
useful in future research for increasing the understanding of when, and perhaps how, these 
thoughts arise. 
Additionally, one may ask whether specific configurations of the background task and 
stimuli leads to more spontaneous future thoughts. Tasks have so far included a variety of 
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stimuli, including visually-presented word phrases (e.g., Barzykowski et al., this issue), aurally-
presented words (Ji et al., this issue) and simple geometric shapes (Irish et al., this issue) – most 
commonly as ‘background’ stimuli, but sometimes representing the main task focus (Jordão et 
al., this issue; Irish et al., this issue). Although one study has examined the effect of verbal cues 
versus no cues (Vannucci et al., 2017), the question of whether images or words are more 
effective in triggering spontaneous future thoughts is difficult to answer as no study has directly 
compared their effects on the nature and frequency of such thoughts (cf. Mazzoni et al., 2014). 
Exploring the role of triggers is particularly important for distinguishing between the 
initiation and maintenance of spontaneous thoughts about the future. Smallwood (2013) has 
suggested that these different stages of the mind-wandering process may rely on different 
mechanisms, which may explain apparently contradictory findings in relation to executive 
resources and the frequency of spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts  (Thomson, Besner, 
& Smilek, 2015). However, research on mind-wandering has rarely explored the 
initiation/maintenance distinction, probably because the absence of meaningful cues in the 
vigilance and go/no-go tasks, used in mind-wandering studies, has constrained the analysis of 
triggers that allow to identify the initiation of a spontaneous thought. The fact that several studies 
in the special issue analyse triggers seems to be an important first step to further distinguish 
processes involved in the initiation versus maintenance of spontaneous thoughts.  
Finally, the relationship between the frequency and type of spontaneous thoughts, elicited 
using go/no-go and vigilance tasks and daily life experience sampling methods, is still unclear 
and it is recommended that studies employ either complex designs (involving methodological 
variants within one study) or a meta-analytic approach to address this issue (for a recent review 
of available methodological tools for studying mind-wandering, see Martinon, Smallwood, 
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McGann, Hamilton & Riby, 2019). This inclusive approach may uncover factors underlying 
inconsistencies in some of the findings obtained across methods (e.g., concerning the effects of 
cues or temporal focus of task-unrelated spontaneous thoughts).  
Effects of individual differences, age, and neurological injury on spontaneous future cognition -  
the ‘who’ question 
Knowledge of the link between types of psychopathology (e.g., rumination, thought 
suppression), on the one hand, and phenomenological qualities and frequency of spontaneous 
future thoughts, on the other, has increased in recent years (e.g., Berntsen et al., 2015, see 
Berntsen, this issue for a review; Beaty et al., this issue; del Palacio-Gonzalez & Berntsen, this 
issue). Additionally, effects of normal development have highlighted that reductions of 
spontaneous future thoughts, if present, are much less marked than in deliberate, constructive 
future thinking, providing insights into the neurocognitive differences between volitional and 
spontaneous future thinking (see Caza & Atance, this issue). 
Although understanding spontaneous thoughts in ageing has improved (see Development 
across the life span above), there are still questions that need to be addressed to find a set of 
conditions or variables that reduce or eliminate negative age effects in the frequency of reported 
spontaneous future thoughts.  As pointed out earlier, future research may need to concentrate on 
the role of external cues (by manipulating their presence or absence) and whether they are 
peripheral or not to the focus of attention when studying effects of age on spontaneous thoughts 
about the future (and the past) to resolve the discrepant findings in relation to ageing reported in 
the literature and in this special issue (see also Jordão, Ferreira-Santos et al., 2019). 
The potential importance of cues has been also highlighted in two recent studies on 
pathological ageing and spontaneous mind-wandering using an easy, undemanding version of the 
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vigilance task with cue words (Niedźwieńska & Kvavilashvili, 2018) and the shape expectations 
task without verbal cues (O’Callaghan et all., 2019) (this task was used by Irish et al., this issue). 
While O’Callaghan et al. (2019) did not find a reliable reduction in spontaneous mind-wandering 
in patients with Alzheimer’s disease, Niedźwieńska and Kvavilashvili (2018) reported marked 
reduction in spontaneous mind-wandering (especially thoughts about the past) in participants 
with Mild Cognitive Impairment compared to healthy controls. Niedźwieńska and Kvavilashvili 
(2018) suggested that the spontaneous processes of eliciting thoughts in response to incidental 
cues, which is preserved in healthy ageing, may be particularly disrupted at early stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease (see also McDaniel, Shelton, Breneiser, Moynan, & Balota, 2011; 
Niedźwieńska, Kvavilashvili, Ashaye & Necar, 2017). Future research needs to examine this 
idea with a special focus on spontaneous future thinking.   
Another related and important avenue for research is to study the nature and frequency of 
spontaneous future thoughts in acquired neurological disorders such as stroke or traumatic brain 
injury. For example, two recent studies on patients with focal lesions in the brain’s default 
network (see Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 2007) showed that while hippocampal 
damage affected the quality of spontaneous future thoughts (less episodic and less vivid than in 
controls) (McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2018), damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex substantially reduced the quantity of mind wandering compared to controls – 
with future mind-wandering being affected most (Bertossi & Ciaramelli, 2016). In both studies, 
however, patients reported significantly more task-unrelated thoughts about the present, 
suggesting that damage to specific areas of the default network can shorten the temporal 
‘window’ normally available when mind wandering (perhaps mirroring what happens during 
constructed mental time travel, e.g., Andelman et al., 2010).  
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Even though ageing and neuropsychological studies of spontaneous future cognition are 
currently small in number, they have started to uncover important similarities and differences to 
known phenomena (see Table 1). Further neuropsychological studies will complement the 
existing set of neuroscientific studies (see Fox & Christoff, 2018 for a review). 
The ‘Why’ question. 
As evidenced above, progress has been made on the how and who questions of 
spontaneous future thought. Though informative, a precise understanding of the mechanism 
underlying the occurrence and maintenance of spontaneous future thoughts, and its possible sub-
types, has yet to be delineated.  
However, such precise explanations of spontaneous future thought may be necessary to 
elucidate the why question, identifying how spontaneous future thoughts can manifest themselves 
in functionally beneficial ways (see Berntsen, this issue), and how they can also sometimes be 
dysfunctional (see Berntsen, this issue; Holmes et al., 2007; for a recent review, see Bulley & 
Irish, 2018). Concerning the beneficial functions of spontaneous future thinking, the link 
between personal goals and spontaneous future thinking has been demonstrated in previous 
studies (e.g., Baird et al., 2011; Cole & Berntsen, 2016; D’Argembeau et al., 2011, Study 2; 
Plimpton et al., 2015) and studies published in this Issue (Jordão et al.; Mazzoni; Warden et al.). 
However, the causal relation between the two is unknown, as is the dynamic interplay between 
current-concerns, cues and future thoughts (Berntsen, this issue), and the fact that no 
comprehensive theory has attempted to accommodate these findings shows that more research is 
required (cf. Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2019). 
Finally, although researchers have interrogated several aspects of this phenomenon (e.g., 
individual differences, priming effects), little is still understood about its content as it is rarely 
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measured or analysed (but see Anderson & McDaniel, 2019; Mazzoni, this issue; Plimpton et al., 
2015; Warden et al., this issue, for exceptions). It is interesting that when Plimpton et al. (2015) 
carried out a thematic content analysis of task-unrelated spontaneous thoughts, reported by 
participants in response to thought probes during the vigilance task, they found that the majority 
of thoughts could be classified into two main categories of intended actions/plans and upcoming 
events, with a very small proportion of thoughts referring to the category of simulated 
hypothetical events. This finding contrasts the taxonomy of intentional forms of episodic future 
thinking by Szpunar, Spreng and Schacter (2014), which classifies the contents of future 
thoughts into simulation, prediction, intention and planning. Clearly, more systematic 
investigation is needed to study the precise contents and the subtypes of spontaneous future 
thoughts (cf. Weinstein, 2018), as this may provide important insights into how they occur (and 
perhaps why they occur when they do).  
Conclusion 
In this Editorial, we presented the past, present and future of a fast-developing field. We 
have shown synergy between traditionally independent areas (of mind-wandering, mental time 
travel and prospective memory) in studies past and present, and recommend such an approach 
going forward. Indeed, such an approach has been fruitfully employed in neuroscience, 
combining findings from episodic future thinking, goal processing and mind wandering, and 
finding commonalities (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). Findings presented in this special 
issue have covered a broad range of areas, showing the field is vibrant and has already made 
important insights, especially on the when, who and how questions. An important challenge will 
be to develop theoretical accounts of spontaneous future thought. To this end, benefits may 
accrue by juxtaposing findings with satellite research areas. We urge researchers to put forward 
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empirically-testable theoretical models of spontaneous future thought, which can be compared 
against each other. This may clarify how, but more importantly why, spontaneous future thoughts 
are so prevalent in daily life (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Warden et al, this issue). We hope that 
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The positioning of spontaneous future cognition in relation to related areas of research. 
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Figure 1: The Intersection between Future Thinking, Prospective Memory and Mind-wandering 
Research, and their connection with Spontaneous Future Cognition 
 
